North Korean Govt Hackers Linked to Play Ransomware Attack
Summary:
The North Korean APT group Andariel, linked to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, was found to be associated with the Play ransomware operation, likely acting as an affiliate or initial access broker. In May 2024, Andariel gained access to a corporate network using compromised credentials. They established control by deploying Mimikatz to harvest credentials from system memory, enabling further lateral movement within the network. Andariel set up command-and-control communication through the Sliver pentesting framework, which allowed them to manage infected hosts covertly over time. After gaining initial access, Andariel distributed their custom info-stealing malware, DTrack, across reachable systems using the SMB protocol, gathering sensitive data on network hosts. They solidified their foothold by creating persistent malicious Windows services and establishing Remote Desktop Protocol sessions for direct access to critical systems. They also removed or disabled endpoint detection and response tools, enhancing their ability to operate undetected.
In September 2024, Andariel deployed the Play ransomware, using common ransomware tools like TokenPlayer and PsExec, strategically placed in folders to evade detection. The ransomware encrypted devices across the network, effectively locking out the organization. Unit 42 researchers found clues indicating coordination between Andariel’s activities and the ransomware deployment, though it remains unclear if Andariel directly launched the ransomware or simply sold network access for Play’s deployment.
Security Officer Comments:
Andariel’s use of ransomware-as-a-service allows them to operate indirectly, sharing ransom payments with other actors in the RaaS ecosystem while evading sanctions. This model aligns with tactics used by other sanctioned groups like Evil Corp, which frequently rebranded to avoid penalties. By functioning as an affiliate or IAB, Andariel enables North Korea to continue cyber-financial operations, evade sanctions, and covertly profit from ransomware activities without directly exposing their ties to North Korean interests.
Suggested Corrections:
Backup your data, system images, and configurations, regularly test them, and keep the backups offline: Ensure that backups are regularly tested and that they are not connected to the business network, as many ransomware variants try to find and encrypt or delete accessible backups. Maintaining current backups offline is critical because if your network data is encrypted with ransomware, your organization can restore systems.
Update and patch systems promptly: This includes maintaining the security of operating systems, applications, and firmware in a timely manner. Consider using a centralized patch management system; use a risk-based assessment strategy to drive your patch management program.
Test your incident response plan: There's nothing that shows the gaps in plans more than testing them. Run through some core questions and use those to build an incident response plan: Are you able to sustain business operations without access to certain systems? For how long? Would you turn off your manufacturing operations if business systems such as billing were offline?
Check Your Security Team's Work: Use a 3rd party pen tester to test the security of your systems and your ability to defend against a sophisticated attack. Many ransomware criminals are aggressive and sophisticated and will find the equivalent of unlocked doors.
Segment your networks: There's been a recent shift in ransomware attacks – from stealing data to disrupting operations. It's critically important that your corporate business functions and manufacturing/production operations are separated and that you carefully filter and limit internet access to operational networks, identify links between these networks, and develop workarounds or manual controls to ensure ICS networks can be isolated and continue operating if your corporate network is compromised. Regularly test contingency plans such as manual controls so that safety-critical functions can be maintained during a cyber incident.
Train employees: Email remains the most vulnerable attack vector for organizations. Users should be trained on how to avoid and spot phishing emails. Multi-factor authentication can help prevent malicious access to sensitive services.
Link(s):
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/ne...ovt-hackers-linked-to-play-ransomware-attack/
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/north-korean-threat-group-play-ransomware/
The North Korean APT group Andariel, linked to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, was found to be associated with the Play ransomware operation, likely acting as an affiliate or initial access broker. In May 2024, Andariel gained access to a corporate network using compromised credentials. They established control by deploying Mimikatz to harvest credentials from system memory, enabling further lateral movement within the network. Andariel set up command-and-control communication through the Sliver pentesting framework, which allowed them to manage infected hosts covertly over time. After gaining initial access, Andariel distributed their custom info-stealing malware, DTrack, across reachable systems using the SMB protocol, gathering sensitive data on network hosts. They solidified their foothold by creating persistent malicious Windows services and establishing Remote Desktop Protocol sessions for direct access to critical systems. They also removed or disabled endpoint detection and response tools, enhancing their ability to operate undetected.
In September 2024, Andariel deployed the Play ransomware, using common ransomware tools like TokenPlayer and PsExec, strategically placed in folders to evade detection. The ransomware encrypted devices across the network, effectively locking out the organization. Unit 42 researchers found clues indicating coordination between Andariel’s activities and the ransomware deployment, though it remains unclear if Andariel directly launched the ransomware or simply sold network access for Play’s deployment.
Security Officer Comments:
Andariel’s use of ransomware-as-a-service allows them to operate indirectly, sharing ransom payments with other actors in the RaaS ecosystem while evading sanctions. This model aligns with tactics used by other sanctioned groups like Evil Corp, which frequently rebranded to avoid penalties. By functioning as an affiliate or IAB, Andariel enables North Korea to continue cyber-financial operations, evade sanctions, and covertly profit from ransomware activities without directly exposing their ties to North Korean interests.
Suggested Corrections:
Backup your data, system images, and configurations, regularly test them, and keep the backups offline: Ensure that backups are regularly tested and that they are not connected to the business network, as many ransomware variants try to find and encrypt or delete accessible backups. Maintaining current backups offline is critical because if your network data is encrypted with ransomware, your organization can restore systems.
Update and patch systems promptly: This includes maintaining the security of operating systems, applications, and firmware in a timely manner. Consider using a centralized patch management system; use a risk-based assessment strategy to drive your patch management program.
Test your incident response plan: There's nothing that shows the gaps in plans more than testing them. Run through some core questions and use those to build an incident response plan: Are you able to sustain business operations without access to certain systems? For how long? Would you turn off your manufacturing operations if business systems such as billing were offline?
Check Your Security Team's Work: Use a 3rd party pen tester to test the security of your systems and your ability to defend against a sophisticated attack. Many ransomware criminals are aggressive and sophisticated and will find the equivalent of unlocked doors.
Segment your networks: There's been a recent shift in ransomware attacks – from stealing data to disrupting operations. It's critically important that your corporate business functions and manufacturing/production operations are separated and that you carefully filter and limit internet access to operational networks, identify links between these networks, and develop workarounds or manual controls to ensure ICS networks can be isolated and continue operating if your corporate network is compromised. Regularly test contingency plans such as manual controls so that safety-critical functions can be maintained during a cyber incident.
Train employees: Email remains the most vulnerable attack vector for organizations. Users should be trained on how to avoid and spot phishing emails. Multi-factor authentication can help prevent malicious access to sensitive services.
Link(s):
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/ne...ovt-hackers-linked-to-play-ransomware-attack/
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/north-korean-threat-group-play-ransomware/