Summary:
In December, a new ransomware group targeting Russian businesses and government agencies was identified, dubbed “Crypt Ghouls.” Investigation revealed connections to other cybercriminal groups through shared tactics, tools, and infrastructure. The group employs a variety of utilities, including Mimikatz and LockBit 3.0 for ransomware attacks, utilizing compromised contractor credentials to gain access via VPN.

The attackers maintain persistence through tools like NSSM and Localtonet, harvesting credentials using XenAllPasswordPro. They executed complex commands to extract sensitive information, including browser credentials and Active Directory data. Additionally, they employed DLL sideloading techniques and encrypted data using popular ransomware variants.

Tools used by the Crypt Ghouls group:

1. Mimikatz: A well-known credential extraction tool used to dump passwords and authentication tokens from memory. It can target processes like lsass.exe to extract sensitive login information.
2. XenAllPasswordPro: A lesser-known tool that the group used to harvest authentication data from various locations within the target systems. It helps in collecting stored passwords from applications.
3. LockBit 3.0: A widely used ransomware variant that encrypts files on compromised systems. The group customized its configuration to specify which files to encrypt and included measures to evade detection.
4. Babuk: Another ransomware variant targeted primarily at Linux systems, particularly ESXi servers. It operates similarly to LockBit but is designed for different environments.
5. NSSM (Non-Sucking Service Manager): Used for managing services on Windows, NSSM can create and manage long-running background processes that help maintain access to compromised systems.
6. Localtonet: This utility helps establish encrypted connections to remote systems, facilitating remote access without drawing attention.
7. AnyDesk: A remote access tool that allows the attackers to control compromised systems directly. It’s often used for maintaining persistent access.
8. PingCastle: A tool for assessing Active Directory security, it helps attackers gather information about the target’s infrastructure.
9. SoftPerfect Network Scanner: Used for network reconnaissance, it identifies open ports and shares within the target network.
10. CobInt: A backdoor loader that executes obfuscated PowerShell scripts to load additional malicious payloads into memory.
11. 7-Zip: While primarily a file compression tool, it was used to archive sensitive data before deletion, likely to exfiltrate or hide the data effectively.

Security Officer Comments:
Analysis suggests significant overlaps in tool usage and tactics with other groups like MorLock and Twelve, indicating potential collaboration or resource sharing among cybercriminals. Victims include various sectors, such as mining and finance. The evolving landscape of these attacks complicates attribution and response efforts, as shared tools and methods make it difficult to pinpoint specific actors behind the threats targeting Russia.

IOCS:
File PathsXenAllPasswordPro Locations:

c:\programdata\allinone2023\xenallpasswordpro.exec:\programdata\dbg\allinone2023\xenallpasswordpro.exec:\programdata\1c\allinone2023\xenallpasswordpro.exe$user\desktop\allinone2023\xenallpasswordpro.exec:\intel\xenallpasswordpro.exeMalicious Loader:

c:\ProgramData\oracle\dismcore.dll (alongside dism.exe)Temporary Files:

C:\Windows\Temp\1713909129.8364425 (browser credentials)C:\Windows\Temp\1713909173.8739672 (browser credentials)Malicious Backdoor:

Intellpui.vbs (loader for CobInt)

Suggested Corrections:
Backup your data, system images, and configurations, regularly test them, and keep the backups offline: Ensure that backups are regularly tested and that they are not connected to the business network, as many ransomware variants try to find and encrypt or delete accessible backups. Maintaining current backups offline is critical because if your network data is encrypted with ransomware, your organization can restore systems.

Update and patch systems promptly: This includes maintaining the security of operating systems, applications, and firmware in a timely manner. Consider using a centralized patch management system; use a risk-based assessment strategy to drive your patch management program.

Test your incident response plan: There's nothing that shows the gaps in plans more than testing them. Run through some core questions and use those to build an incident response plan: Are you able to sustain business operations without access to certain systems? For how long? Would you turn off your manufacturing operations if business systems such as billing were offline?

Check Your Security Team's Work: Use a 3rd party pen tester to test the security of your systems and your ability to defend against a sophisticated attack. Many ransomware criminals are aggressive and sophisticated and will find the equivalent of unlocked doors.

Segment your networks: There's been a recent shift in ransomware attacks – from stealing data to disrupting operations. It's critically important that your corporate business functions and manufacturing/production operations are separated and that you carefully filter and limit internet access to operational networks, identify links between these networks, and develop workarounds or manual controls to ensure ICS networks can be isolated and continue operating if your corporate network is compromised. Regularly test contingency plans such as manual controls so that safety-critical functions can be maintained during a cyber incident.

Train employees: Email remains the most vulnerable attack vector for organizations. Users should be trained on how to avoid and spot phishing emails. Multi-factor authentication can help prevent malicious access to sensitive services.

Link(s):
https://securelist.com/crypt-ghouls-hacktivists-tools-overlap-analysis/114217/